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Regulating Short-Term Accommodation within Condominium 
 
Semmler v The Owners, Strata Plan NES3039, 2018 BCSC 2064  
 
Douglas C Harris* 
 
Owning land within condominium, or strata property as it is known in British 
Columbia, includes holding an individual strata lot, a share of the common property, 
and the right to participate in governing the uses of the private and common 
property. Owners participate in governing through membership and voting rights in 
a strata corporation which has the responsibility to maintain the common property 
and the authority to establish bylaws that restrict the use of the common and 
private property. The corollary of membership and a voice in the affairs of the strata 
corporation is a duty to accept its governing authority. 
Airbnb, Expedia, and other digital platforms that facilitate short-term 
accommodation have caused governments at many levels, including provinces, 
regional districts, municipalities, and strata corporations, to consider restricting this 
use of residential property. In this comment, I review the decision of the British 
Columbia Supreme Court (BCSC) in Semmler v The Owners, Strata Plan NES3039, a 
case involving a dispute between an owner and strata corporation over short-term 
accommodation.1  
Justice Baker’s decision in favour of the owner turns on a characterization of 
short-term accommodation agreements as licences, not leases, and also on a ruling 
that the fines against the owner were significantly unfair. I set out the reasons for 
decision in greater detail below, and then suggest that they are not convincing. In 
particular, although the case turns on a finding that short-term accommodation 
occur under licences, at certain important points Justice Baker reverts to 
characterizing short-term accommodation as rentals. In addition, she is too quick to 
rule that the actions of the strata corporation were significantly unfair. 
The decision has shortcomings, but it does provide a useful example of the 
challenge that collective government within condominium poses to deeply rooted 
understandings of land ownership within the common law. And at a practical level, 
strata corporations in BC that wish to restrict short-term accommodation should not 
ignore the ruling that rental restriction bylaws miss the mark. 
The Valley’s Edge Resort in Edgewater, BC, is a 201-lot bare land strata 
property subdivision that combines “cottage” lots and recreational vehicle (RV) lots. 
Promotional material describes it as “a 4-seasons private resort” that includes a 
clubhouse, swimming pool, tennis court, and other recreational amenities for the 
owners and their guests.2                                                         
*Professor and Nathan T. Nemetz Chair in Legal History, The University of British Columbia, 
Peter A. Allard School of Law. Thanks to Kevin Zakreski for comments on an earlier draft. 
1 Semmler v The Owners, Strata Plan NES3039, 2018 BCSC 2064 [Semmler]. 
2 Valley’s Edge Resort, “About Valley’s Edge Resort,” online: 
<https://www.valleysedgeresort.ca/a-about-us/> [accessed: 6 December 2018].  
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In 2009, in what appears to be an attempt to preserve the recreational 
orientation of the development, the Valley’s Edge strata corporation introduced a 
Residency Bylaw to ensure that owners used their strata lots as secondary dwellings 
and not as principal residences or for business purposes: 
 
4(11) The strata lot shall not be used as a principal place of residence, save and 
except for bona fide retirees and persons employed by the strata in the 
management, security, repair or maintenance of the common property of the 
Strata. Such persons must have the prior written approval of the council. No strata 
lot shall be used for any business purpose whatsoever without prior approval by 
the council. No inventory for the purpose of a business shall be visibly stored upon 
any strata lot.3 
 
Then in 2015, in an attempt to stop owners from using their strata lots to 
provide short-term accommodation, the strata corporation passed the following 
Rental Restriction Bylaw Amendment: 
 
4(47) No Strata Lot may be rented for a term of less than thirty (30) consecutive 
days.4  
 
At the municipal level, the Regional District of the East Kootenay (RDEK) does 
not appear to have turned its attention directly to short term accommodation. 
However, it has zoned according to land use, and the zoning map for Edgewater 
shows the cottage lots within Valley’s Edge as R-1(B) Single Family Residential and 
the RV lots as RES-1 Recreation Accommodation.5 
 Kristen Semmler purchased a cottage strata lot in Valley’s Edge in 2008. Since 
2010, she has advertised it for short-term accommodation through her property 
management company. 
Sometime after passing the Rental Restriction Bylaw, Valley’s Edge began to 
fine Semmler for bylaw infractions. In response, Semmler petitioned the BCSC to 
quash the fines and to order that the bylaw did not apply to short-term 
accommodation. In turn, the strata corporation sought an order to enforce 
compliance with the Rental Restriction Bylaw and the prohibition on business use in 
the Residency Bylaws. The strata corporation also argued that short-term 
accommodation violated the RDEK’s residential zoning. 
Justice Baker held in favour of Semmler. In doing so, she ruled that neither 
the RDEK’s single-family residential zoning nor the strata corporation’s prohibitions                                                         
3 Valley’s Edge Resort, “Disclosure and Governance,” online:  
<https://www.valleysedgeresort.ca/a-disclosure-and-governance/> [accessed 12 December 
2018], “Residency Bylaw Amendment,” 1 April 2009 [emphasis added]. 
4 Ibid “Rental Restriction Bylaw Amendment,” 10 March 2015.   
5 RDEK, Columbia Valley Zoning Consolidation, Bylaw No. 900, 1992, Edgewater Zoning Map, 
online: 
<ftp://ftp.rdek.bc.ca/planningbylaws/bl900_ucv_zoning_consalidated/bl900_ucv_zoning_e
dgewater_a10_jun18.pdf> [accessed: 12 December 2018].  
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on business use and short-term rentals applied to Semmler’s use of her strata lot. 
Justice Baker also ruled that it would be significantly unfair to enforce the fines 
against Semmler because she had purchased the strata lot with a reasonable 
expectation that she could use it for short-term accommodation to paying 
customers. 
Dealing first with the Residency Bylaw, Justice Baker held that the prohibition 
on “any business purpose whatsoever” banned the locating or running of a business 
from a strata lot, but not the selling of short-term accommodation.6 This ruling 
seems consistent with what appears to be the bylaw’s intent, which is to maintain 
the “resort” or recreational environment of Valley’s Edge by prohibiting the use of 
strata lots as principal residences or as locations from which to operate a business. 
Short-term accommodation would not diminish this recreation orientation and so 
does not appear to contravene the purpose behind the bylaw.  
What then about the RDEK’s residential zoning? Having concluded that 
selling short-term accommodation was not a business purpose, Justice Baker ruled: 
“Nothing in zoning bylaw R-1(B) prohibits the rental of a dwelling house.”7 In short, 
the residential zoning did not preclude rentals, including short-term accommodation 
rentals. 
There are two difficulties with this characterization of short-term 
accommodation as a rental and thus falling within residential zoning. First, although 
Justice Baker ruled that selling short-term accommodation was not captured by the 
prohibition on business purposes in the Residency Bylaw, it clearly is a business or 
commercial purpose and thus difficult to fit within residential zoning. In Nanaimo 
(Regional District) v Saccomani, the BCSC grappled directly with the question of 
whether short-term accommodation was a permitted use within residential zoning 
and concluded that it was not: “Short-term accommodation and residential 
accommodation are two completely different uses of land.”8 This decision required 
Justice Baker’s attention. 
The other difficulty with Justice Baker’s characterization of short-term 
accommodation as “the rental of a dwelling house” is that it is inconsistent with her 
next finding that Semmler was not renting her strata lot but licensing it.9 The 
characterization of short-term accommodation agreements as licences follows 
HighStreet Accommodations Ltd. v The Owners, Strata Plan BCS2478 in which a 
hospitality management company that rented a strata lot to sell short-term 
accommodation attempted to use the protections in the Strata Property Act for 
existing tenants to avoid a new bylaw prohibiting short-term accommodation.10 The 
BCSC ruled that the occupants used the strata lot under licences, not leases, and 
therefore that the company could not rely on the protections for existing tenants.                                                          
6 Semmler, supra note 1, at para 23. 
7 Ibid at para 25. 
8 Nanaimo (Regional District) v Saccomani, 2018 BCSC 752 at para 54. 
9 Semmler, supra note 1 at para 46. 
10 HighStreet Accommodations Ltd. v The Owners, Strata Plan BCS2478, 2017 BCSC 1039. 
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Following Highstreet, Justice Baker ruled that Semmler granted licences for 
her strata lot, not leases, and therefore the Rental Restriction Bylaw did not apply. 
This strict reading of “rented” seems at odds with the intent of the bylaw and it 
discounts the widespread use of “rental” when describing short-term 
accommodation. Moreover, the ruling that short-term accommodation occurs under 
a licence is not consistent with her preceding determination that, for the purposes 
of the RDEK’s residential zoning designation, Semmler was renting her strata lot. 
In the final part of the judgment, Justice Baker turned to the two-part test 
set out in Dollan v The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 1589 for determining when the 
actions of a strata corporation are “significantly unfair.”11 In applying this test, 
Justice Baker ruled, first, that when Semmler purchased the strata lot in Valley’s 
Edge she had a reasonable expectation “that she would be permitted to generate 
income through the rental of her strata lot” 12  and, second, that the Rental 
Restriction Bylaw violated this reasonable expectation and, thus, was significantly 
unfair.13 
The first ruling misconstrues what it is reasonable for owners to expect 
within strata property. Semmler may well have expected to earn income from selling 
short-term accommodation when she purchased her strata lot, but she had no 
reasonable expectation that the permitted uses of strata lots would remain 
unchanged. The collective power of owners, through a strata corporation, to govern 
the uses of private lots is one of the principal features of strata property ownership, 
and strata corporations have the capacity under the Strata Property Act to amend 
their bylaws and thus to change permitted uses. As a result, there is no reasonable 
expectation that the permitted uses at the time of purchase will remain permitted 
uses if the owners, through a bylaw amendment, decide otherwise. 
Justice Baker was also too quick to find that the strata corporation’s actions 
were significantly unfair. This finding seems animated by the fact that the resort’s 
developer owned and rented the RV lots. As an owner of strata lots, the developer 
had voted in favour of the Rental Restriction Bylaw, but as owner-developer was not 
subject to the bylaw under a provision exempting developers and original 
purchasers in the Strata Property Act.14 However, Justice Baker found nothing 
improper in the owner-developer’s exercise of its voting rights.15 Moreover, there 
was no indication that it was using the RV lots for short-term accommodation in a 
manner that contravened the Rental Restriction Bylaw. The lots are currently 
advertised for 2-month minimum terms.16 Indeed, given the absence of procedural 
impropriety and of any suggestion that the owner-developer was using its voting 
power in the strata corporation to target particular owners with oppressive bylaws,                                                         
11 Dollan v The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 1589, 2012 BCCA 44. 
12 Semmler, supra note 1 at para 63. 
13 Ibid at para 83. 
14 Ibid at para 75. 
15 Ibid at para at 78. 
16 Valley’s Edge Resort, “Seasonal Rentals at Valley’s Edge Resort,” online: 
<https://www.valleysedgeresort.ca/a-seasonal-rentals/> [accessed: 12 December 2018]. 
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it is hard to find a basis for concluding that the actions of the strata corporation 
were “significantly unfair”. 
The reasons for decisions are not convincing, but they help to reveal the 
challenge that condominium government presents to deeply rooted understandings 
within the common law about what it means to be an owner of land. Whether short-
term accommodation is labeled licensing or renting, the power of an owner to make 
time-limited grants of possession is a well-established incidence of ownership. In 
some jurisdictions, courts have knocked back the attempts of condominium 
corporations to restrict rentals on the basis that the statutory authority for 
condominium corporations is insufficiently clear for them to take away such an 
important incidence of ownership.17 The reflex of common law courts is to preserve 
the incidents of land ownership, and thus to be suspicious of collective power to 
curtail them. 
Similarly, there is a wariness within common law doctrine, particularly that 
dealing with positive and restrictive covenants, of private rule-making and rule-
enforcing authority over the uses of land.18 Condominium constructs exactly such a 
private governing regime. Indeed, a structure of private government with authority 
to restrict the uses of land and assess fees is one of the principal features of 
condominium. Given the caution within common law doctrine about private 
attempts to burden land with restrictions and owners with responsibilities, it should 
not be surprising that the courts find ways to curtail and restrain the governing 
authority of condominium government. 
Whether correctly decided or not, and whatever the underlying influences, 
from a practical standpoint, strata corporations in BC that wish to restrict short-term 
accommodation should take into account the finding in Semmler that short-term 
accommodation occurs under a licence, not a lease, and therefore that the language 
of renting or leasing in a bylaw may not capture it. This much is clear. It is also clear 
that the struggle to find an appropriate balance between the individual interests of 
owners and the collective government of owners will be an enduring feature of 
ownership embedded within condominium. 
                                                        
17 See Owners Corporation PS 501391P v Balcombe, [2016] VSC 384 at para 124, in which the 
Victoria Supreme Court in Australia concluded that the state’s condominium legislation did 
not give owners corporations the authority to prohibit short-term letting: 
In summary, I do not consider that the Parliament conferred powers on bodies 
corporate for the Statutory Purpose of substantially interfering with rights and 
privileges usually attendant upon freehold owners. 
18 For a discussion of covenants in the context of condominium, see Cathy Sherry, Strata 
Title Property Rights: Private Governance of Multi-Owned Properties (London: Routledge, 
2017), 12-14, 60-61. 
